Research
Social Evolution and the Evolutionary Tragedy of the Commons
If genes are favoured which act selfishly to ensure their propagation into future generations (the "selfish-gene"), then cooperation should not evolve. Despite this, we observe cooperative behaviours across a wide range of taxa, and seemingly selfless acts can be seen every day in villages and cities across the globe. Public goods, in which resources are shared 
collectively, are often prone to over exploitation, known as the tragedy of the commons. The same mechanisms which can promote cooperation work together to prevent the exploitation of public goods. Our research aims at finding out which mechanisms may resolve the tragedy of the commons. We are also interested in information and how the brain processes information, particularly with respect to the resolution of conflict and promotion of cooperation.
The following questions are asked:
- Can simple (and blind) ecological processes resolve the evolutionary tragedy of the commons?
- How is information used in cooperation and conflict?
- What happens if information is limiting?
References
- Gardner A & Foster KR 2008 The evolution and ecology of cooperation: history and concepts. In: Ecology of Social Evolution. (J. Korb & J. Heinz eds.), pp 1-36. Springer.
- Lehmann L. and Keller L. The evolution of cooperation and altruism - A general framework and a classification of models. Journal of Evolutionary Biology 19:1365-1376.
- Rankin, D.J., Bargum, K. & Kokko, H. (2007) The tragedy of the commons in evolutionary biology. Trends in Ecology and Evolution 22: 643-651
- Rankin, D.J. & Eggimann, F. (In Press) The evolution of judgement-bias in indirect reciprocity. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London: Biological Sciences
